1 - Russell’s Teapot
"If I were to suggest that between the Earth and Mars there is a china teapot revolving about the sun in an elliptical orbit, nobody would be able to disprove my assertion provided I were careful to add that the teapot is too small to be revealed even by our most powerful telescopes.” - Bertrand Russell
The argument implicit here is that because no evidence or explanation for disbelief in an extraterrestrial teapot is required, so it is with God. But here exists a clear category error. The existence of a china teapot in space would explain nothing and require much to be explained, whereas a proof of the existence of God would explain the origins of the universe, morality, history of religion, consciousness and much more, in one fell sweep!
Furthermore, the properties of said teapot that make its existence unlikely are that it appears to be a designed object, and we think it improbable that it could have been placed there by intelligent life without our knowledge. But this is inherently a design argument, which - by definition as both an uncreated being, and outside of our universe - God is not susceptible to.
Imagine I came home one day to find my room (usually faithfully demonstrating entropy of a closed system over time) in perfect order. My bookshelves stacked and labelled alphabetically, and my desk devoid of scrap paper and chocolate wrappers. Two hypotheses occur to me, the first is the existence of Russell’s teapot and the second is that my mother became tired of my mess, cleaned my room, and subsequently left the house.
Both of these hypotheses are coherent and (temporarily) not testable. But does that mean they are equally valid? Of course not! Either could well be true or false according to the information we have, but to assert that they are therefore both carry 50/50 probability is ridiculous.
The proper way to go about things is to observe the world around us, and thus form hypotheses that both are explanatory and not superfluous, and see which theory explains the most, assuming the least. The second criterion, while less obvious than the first, is a pretty crucial scientific principle known as Occam’s Razor;
“It is pointless to do with more what can be done with fewer.” - William of Ocker
"If I were to suggest that between the Earth and Mars there is a china teapot revolving about the sun in an elliptical orbit, nobody would be able to disprove my assertion provided I were careful to add that the teapot is too small to be revealed even by our most powerful telescopes.” - Bertrand Russell
The argument implicit here is that because no evidence or explanation for disbelief in an extraterrestrial teapot is required, so it is with God. But here exists a clear category error. The existence of a china teapot in space would explain nothing and require much to be explained, whereas a proof of the existence of God would explain the origins of the universe, morality, history of religion, consciousness and much more, in one fell sweep!
Furthermore, the properties of said teapot that make its existence unlikely are that it appears to be a designed object, and we think it improbable that it could have been placed there by intelligent life without our knowledge. But this is inherently a design argument, which - by definition as both an uncreated being, and outside of our universe - God is not susceptible to.
Imagine I came home one day to find my room (usually faithfully demonstrating entropy of a closed system over time) in perfect order. My bookshelves stacked and labelled alphabetically, and my desk devoid of scrap paper and chocolate wrappers. Two hypotheses occur to me, the first is the existence of Russell’s teapot and the second is that my mother became tired of my mess, cleaned my room, and subsequently left the house.
Both of these hypotheses are coherent and (temporarily) not testable. But does that mean they are equally valid? Of course not! Either could well be true or false according to the information we have, but to assert that they are therefore both carry 50/50 probability is ridiculous.
The proper way to go about things is to observe the world around us, and thus form hypotheses that both are explanatory and not superfluous, and see which theory explains the most, assuming the least. The second criterion, while less obvious than the first, is a pretty crucial scientific principle known as Occam’s Razor;
“It is pointless to do with more what can be done with fewer.” - William of Ocker
This is often used in an argument against the existence of God as follows:
2 - God of the gaps
“People think that epilepsy is divine simply because they don't have any idea what causes epilepsy. But I believe that someday we will understand what causes epilepsy, and at that moment, we will cease to believe that it's divine. And so it is with everything in the universe” - Hippocrates
This is merely a straw-man argument. A theist does not pose that God is (and only is) responsible for the complex mysteries of reality that we are yet to fathom, by merely “performing magic”. As John Lennox puts it; “God is not a ‘God of the gaps’, he is God of the whole show.”
Furthermore, theism is the only world-view that provides an explanation for the intelligibility of the universe which is the foundation of scientific investigation! The argument assumes that we can only see God’s workings through what we do not understand, and completely fails to acknowledge that, in the eyes of the theist, knowing what God has done is not a matter of scientific determination, but of exegesis.
So we see that Occam’s razor is grossly unsuitable as an offensive weapon for the atheist. But more than this, we shall presently see that it is an adequate benefactor of theism.
Currently the only non-theistic theories concerning how the universe came to be that claim to be complete involve infinite numbers of unobservable universes. As J. Budziszewski wittily puts it:
“The principle of inference seems to be not Occam's Razor but Occam's Beard: ‘Multiply entities unnecessarily.’ ”
It is no use the atheist saying “But the only complicated bit is right at the beginning; everything else is simple!” as Occam’s razor must be allowed to work on the whole system. A train that takes you 95% of the way to your destination but leaves you having to scale a mountain on foot is far worse than a car that takes you all the way at a slightly slower speed!
This is merely a straw-man argument. A theist does not pose that God is (and only is) responsible for the complex mysteries of reality that we are yet to fathom, by merely “performing magic”. As John Lennox puts it; “God is not a ‘God of the gaps’, he is God of the whole show.”
Furthermore, theism is the only world-view that provides an explanation for the intelligibility of the universe which is the foundation of scientific investigation! The argument assumes that we can only see God’s workings through what we do not understand, and completely fails to acknowledge that, in the eyes of the theist, knowing what God has done is not a matter of scientific determination, but of exegesis.
So we see that Occam’s razor is grossly unsuitable as an offensive weapon for the atheist. But more than this, we shall presently see that it is an adequate benefactor of theism.
Currently the only non-theistic theories concerning how the universe came to be that claim to be complete involve infinite numbers of unobservable universes. As J. Budziszewski wittily puts it:
“The principle of inference seems to be not Occam's Razor but Occam's Beard: ‘Multiply entities unnecessarily.’ ”
It is no use the atheist saying “But the only complicated bit is right at the beginning; everything else is simple!” as Occam’s razor must be allowed to work on the whole system. A train that takes you 95% of the way to your destination but leaves you having to scale a mountain on foot is far worse than a car that takes you all the way at a slightly slower speed!
3 - Pascal’s Wager
Our investigation into the burden of proof addresses the question: “How much evidence must there be for theism to warrant belief?”
But there is a similar, more subtle question that arises naturally from settling this one that we should attempt to answer; “How sure must I be of the truth of Christianity to act upon it as if it were true?”
This is somewhat of a silly question, and so I am afraid we here descend slightly onto some slightly less logical terrain. Of course the answer of this has no bearing on how likely Christianity is to be true, but there are two good reasons why the answer is not just “trivially anything above 50%”.
One reason is simply that we are not completely logical creatures. A lot of the time we believe things simply because we want to. The reason we tend to accept facts when we deduce that they are true is that, most of the time, the more closely our knowledge resembles complete truth the better off we will be.
But sometimes this is not the case (at least when “better off” is seen to mean mental and physical well-being) and thus we may reject things we know to be true to better ourselves in this regard. So the answer depends on whether believing will benefit us, or indeed benefit others.
Atheists no doubt will here jump in and claim that, as being Christian means doing a lot of extra things and restricting yourself in many ways, this supports atheism as a belief system. But to refute this argument I simply quote past president of Royal College of Psychiatrists Andrew Sims:
“The advantageous effect of religious belief and spirituality on mental and physical health is one of the best kept secrets in psychiatry and medicine generally.”
And Professor of Anthropology David Sloan Wilson:
“On average, religious believers are more pro-social than non-believers, feel better about themselves, use their time more constructively, and engage in long-term planning rather than gratifying their impulsive desires. On a moment-by-moment basis, they report being more happy, active, sociable, involved and excited. Some of these differences remain even when religious and non-religious believers are matched for their degree of pro-sociality.”
Having established that this argument does not favour the atheist, let us see if it can be pushed further in the favour of theism. We look next to Pascal’s Wager, which uses game theory to suggest that, if there is a non-zero chance Christianity is true, we should act as if it is.
One way out of this is to respond by further categorising people as “good” and “bad” and supposing that this, and not belief, determines where one spends eternity, if Christianity exists. But even with these assumptions (which seem to argue that if Christianity is true, then Christian doctrine is false!) are granted, one is still back to the issue of religion belief being beneficial, and so again, the argument stacks against atheism.
A second proposed route of escape is offered by the new atheists;
“[Pascal’s wager] seems a cop-out, because the same could be said of Father Christmas and tooth fairies. There may be fairies at the bottom of the garden. There is no evidence for it, but you can't prove that there aren't any, so shouldn't we be agnostic with respect to fairies?” - Richard Dawkins
“So next time someone tells me they believe in God, I’ll say “Oh which one? Zeus? Hades? Jupiter? Mars? Odin? Thor? Krishna? Vishnu? Ra?…” If they say “Just God. I only believe in the one God,” I’ll point out that they are nearly as atheistic as me. I don’t believe in 2,870 gods, and they don’t believe in 2,869.” - Ricky Gervais
But there is a similar, more subtle question that arises naturally from settling this one that we should attempt to answer; “How sure must I be of the truth of Christianity to act upon it as if it were true?”
This is somewhat of a silly question, and so I am afraid we here descend slightly onto some slightly less logical terrain. Of course the answer of this has no bearing on how likely Christianity is to be true, but there are two good reasons why the answer is not just “trivially anything above 50%”.
One reason is simply that we are not completely logical creatures. A lot of the time we believe things simply because we want to. The reason we tend to accept facts when we deduce that they are true is that, most of the time, the more closely our knowledge resembles complete truth the better off we will be.
But sometimes this is not the case (at least when “better off” is seen to mean mental and physical well-being) and thus we may reject things we know to be true to better ourselves in this regard. So the answer depends on whether believing will benefit us, or indeed benefit others.
Atheists no doubt will here jump in and claim that, as being Christian means doing a lot of extra things and restricting yourself in many ways, this supports atheism as a belief system. But to refute this argument I simply quote past president of Royal College of Psychiatrists Andrew Sims:
“The advantageous effect of religious belief and spirituality on mental and physical health is one of the best kept secrets in psychiatry and medicine generally.”
And Professor of Anthropology David Sloan Wilson:
“On average, religious believers are more pro-social than non-believers, feel better about themselves, use their time more constructively, and engage in long-term planning rather than gratifying their impulsive desires. On a moment-by-moment basis, they report being more happy, active, sociable, involved and excited. Some of these differences remain even when religious and non-religious believers are matched for their degree of pro-sociality.”
Having established that this argument does not favour the atheist, let us see if it can be pushed further in the favour of theism. We look next to Pascal’s Wager, which uses game theory to suggest that, if there is a non-zero chance Christianity is true, we should act as if it is.
Pascal’s Wager
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God exists
|
God does not exist
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Belief in God
|
Infinite reward in heaven
|
Finite loss (at worst!)
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Disbelief in God
|
Infinite loss in hell
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Finite gain (at best!)
|
One way out of this is to respond by further categorising people as “good” and “bad” and supposing that this, and not belief, determines where one spends eternity, if Christianity exists. But even with these assumptions (which seem to argue that if Christianity is true, then Christian doctrine is false!) are granted, one is still back to the issue of religion belief being beneficial, and so again, the argument stacks against atheism.
A second proposed route of escape is offered by the new atheists;
“[Pascal’s wager] seems a cop-out, because the same could be said of Father Christmas and tooth fairies. There may be fairies at the bottom of the garden. There is no evidence for it, but you can't prove that there aren't any, so shouldn't we be agnostic with respect to fairies?” - Richard Dawkins
“So next time someone tells me they believe in God, I’ll say “Oh which one? Zeus? Hades? Jupiter? Mars? Odin? Thor? Krishna? Vishnu? Ra?…” If they say “Just God. I only believe in the one God,” I’ll point out that they are nearly as atheistic as me. I don’t believe in 2,870 gods, and they don’t believe in 2,869.” - Ricky Gervais
But note that neither variant of this argument stands in the light of our investigation into Russell’s Teapot. The difference between belief in no gods, and in one God is exactly the same as the difference between belief in no gods, and in many gods, purely in terms of explanatory power. And the same applies to fairies.
You can assign as much weight as you like to this section. Indeed, I am not sure how much value I assign to it. But the important point is that if anything this is an argument in favour of theism.
You can assign as much weight as you like to this section. Indeed, I am not sure how much value I assign to it. But the important point is that if anything this is an argument in favour of theism.
4 - Non-cognitivism
This is the final school of thought worth considering before we wrap up this post; non-cognitivism asserts that moral statements are not propositions, and thus cannot be known to be true or false, and that therefore talk of moral knowledge (or indeed of God) is meaningless.
This viewpoint does not worry me. One can think of God without considering morality; instead simply utilising the purely philosophically (well) defined idea of an uncreated sentient being as an explanation for reality. Also, whether moral statements are propositional or not is contingent on whether or not there is an objective basis for morality, which in turn is contingency on whether or not God exists.
So, in essence, the argument reduces to: “Suppose God does not exist. Then discussion of God is meaningless.”, a sentiment with which I wholeheartedly agree, without introducing any doubt into my theistic world-view!
Overall it is fairly clear to me that the burden of proof argument for atheism as a default position holds little weight. In fact, as history readily reveals, the obvious initial conclusion drawn upon observing the universe is that God does exist. This is not at all meant as evidence that God does exist, but rather as evidence that the best course of action is to evaluate whether or not God exists fairly, without defaulting to atheism until God’s existence is as good as proven! Now that we have established that, we can go on to look at the evidence either way through the correct lenses, as it were.
Happy searching!
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